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THE IMPACT of pension fund operations on the capital markets
depends upon the investment policies followed by portfolio manag-
ers. Our concern is primarily with differential effects. What differ-
ence does it make when funds flow through these financial interme-
diaries, rather than through other channels? This chapter provides
some answers to this question in the case of pension plans for
employees of business firms and nonprofit institutions. Governmen-
tal plans of all kinds are dealt with in Chapter VI.
INSURED PLANS
Growth Trends
When pension commitments are funded by premium payments
to, or deposits with, a life insurance company, they are described as
being insured. The form of the contract is not material to our
consideration. Suffice it to say, the insurance company is seeking to
provide as good a return on the fund as possible within the statutes
governing investments after allowance for adequate reserves for
possible losses. The actual process involves a mingling of the funds
with all others available for employment in the capital markets.'
Thus, we can think of insured pension funds as a portion of life
insurance loans and investments. In general, it is valid to assume
that receipts are invested across the whole range of assets, enhanc-
'Certain qualifications to this general statement are discussed below.68 Economic Aspects of Pensions
ing the companies' ability to lend and invest but not changing it in
any material respect. The reserve liabilities of a life insurer under a
group annuity contract are different from those created by an equiv-
alent premium volume from, say, ordinary life insurance; but it is
not clear that this fact affects the investment policies of the corn-
TABLE 6




(billions of (billions of (2) ÷ (1) a
Year dollars) dollars) (Per cent)
End (1) (2) (3)
1940 1.6 0.2 13
1945 3.7 0.4 09
1950 4.4 0.8 18
1955 5.9 1.3 22
1960 5.9 1.3 22
1961 7.2 1.4 19
1%2 6.5 1.4 21
1963 7.8 1.7 21
1964 8.3 2.0 23
1965 9.4 2.1 22
Source: Computed from Institute of Life Insurance, Private and
Public Pension Plans in the United States and Life Insurance Fact
Book.
aComputedbefore rounding.
pany. The objective of earning a high, stable rate of return is
similar, if not identical, in both cases.
The growth of pension programs has added materially to the
assets of life insurance companies, as indicated in Table 6. At the
end of 1965, assets balancing insured pension reserves of $27.3
billion were equal to 17 per cent of total assets of all life insurance
companies in the United States and 19 per cent of invested assets
(excluding cash, policy loans, home office buildings, and premiumsImpact on Capital: Private Funds 69
due). The proportions have increased over the years because assets
attributable to pension plans have grown more rapidly than assets
employed in other areas of the business. In 1950, both proportions
were only 9 per cent. Over the period 1940—55, life insurance
assets grew at a compound annual rate of 7.4 per cent, but the
growth rate slowed down in the mid-1950's and was only 5.8 per
cent in 1955—65. This slackening occurred in spite of a generally
rising growth rate for life insurance in force. The latter rate in-
creased from 7.8 per cent in 1940—55 to 9.0 per cent in 1955—65.
The change in growth patterns is shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Life Insurance Growth Rates, Five-Year Periods, 1940-65
(per cent)
Insurance




1940—45 5.6 7.8 7.2
1945—50 8.7 7.4 6.7
1950—55 8.2 7.2 6.3
1955—60 9.2 5.7 5.0
1960—65 8.7 5.8 5.5
Excludes credit life insurance.
The reason that assets increased less than insurance in force is
that the saving component in the contract mix fell. For example, the
proportion of endowment policies decreased from about 15 per
cent of individual life insurance in force in 1950 to 7 per cent in
1962.2 Group insurance, meanwhile, increased its share of the total
(exclusive of credit life insurance) from 21 per cent to 33 per cent.
Another view of the same trend is visible from the flow-of-funds
accounts of the Federal Reserve System. If the increase in life
insurance reserves is expressed as a fraction of total financial assets
acquired by households, the proportion falls rather continuously
2 Institute of Life Insurance.70 Economic Aspects of Pensions
from 21 per cent in 1946, the first year for which data are avail-
able, to 10 per cent in 1964 and 1965.
Some loss of market share in the saving field suffered by life
insurance companies has not been accepted with equanimity. To
regain their former position, managements are emphasizing the sale
of ordinary life contracts in intensified sales efforts. But more im-
portantly for the particular concerns of this study, a strenuous effort
is being made to regain lost ground in the pension area, as more
fully treated below.
Portfolio Composition
Although the life insurance industry has participated actively in
practically all segments of the capital markets, it has become the
dominant institutional lender in two areas: directly placed long-
term loans to business and mortgages on commercial and industrial
properties. The distribution of invested assets at the end of 1965
and increase in ownership during the preceding decade provide a
summary view of life insurance portfolio activity.
The data in Table 8 provide a picture of how some $16 billion of
insured pension fund accumulations have been invested during the
past decade along with other life insurance assets. The striking
feature of recent years has been the active financing of business
firms through directly placed term loans and mortgages on commer-
cial and industrial properties. Private pension arrangements have,
then, made an important contribution to the extensive financing of
the high level of business investment and, secondarily, to the expan-
sion in the stock of housing.3
Competitive Influences
The normal competition among life insurance companies for
superior earnings on investments, which has been responsible for
For extensive treatment of the lending and investing activities of life insurance
companies, reference can be made to Life Insurance Association of America, Life
insurance Companies as Financial institutions, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, and
Andrew F. Brimmer, Life Insurance Companies in the Capital Market, East
Lansing, Michigan, 1962.Impact on Capital: Private Funds 71
TABLE 8




Assets dollars) of Total dollars)
Bonds
U.S. Government 5.1 3.5 —3.5
Foreign government 0.9 0.6 0.4
State, provincial, and local 5.5 3.8 2.8
Railroad 3.3 2.3 —0.6
Public utility 17.0 11.8 3.1















Farm 4.8 3.3 2.6
One- to four-family 29.9 20.6 12.2














Total 145.0 100.0 61.2
Source: Computed from Institute of Life Insurance, Life insurance Fact Book, and
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Source Book.
Note: Excluding cash, policy loans, home office buildings, and premiums due.
many innovations in capital market instruments, has been rein-
forced by competition from other managers of pension fund accu-
mulations. In 1950, when insured pension reserves amounted to
$5.6 billion, trusteed plans had amassed $6.5 billion of assets. By
the end of 1965, trusteed assets of $58 billion were more than
double the $27.3 billion of insured pension reserves.
The flexibility of trusteed plans, especially in equity investment,72 Economic Aspects of Pensions
accounted for much of the loss in market share sustained by life
insurance companies. The industry has obtained relief from taxa-
tion which formerly applied to insured pension plans and has taken
a series of steps to be more competitive. The first was to promote
split funding. In this arrangement, the insurance company managed
the fixed-income portion of the fund, while a bank would handle the
remainder committed to common stock investments. By offering a
return based on the earnings on new money, instead of the average
portfolio earnings rate, this type of contract has been an important
competitive weapon. Since new money has been invested largely in
corporate direct placements and conventional mortgages, the high-
est-yielding classes of assets, the rate offered in recent years has
been relatively attractive.
The most recent step taken by life insurance companies to im-
prove their competitive position has been to secure authority to
manage "separate accounts" in which insured pension funds can•
participate. These separate accounts enable a company to offer an
equity investment facility outside of the usual range of guarantee
and valuation problems. This development is too recent (only $580
million in separate accounts at the end of 1966) to determine
whether it will be of major competitive assistance, but it is evidence
that in the future life insurance companies will be more effectively
competitive in the pension field. It is equally clear that the field of
equity investment will become of greater importance to ukinsur-
ance company portfolio managers.
TRUSTEED PLANS
Evolution of Investment Management
As previously indicated, trusteed pension funds have been one of
the most rapidly growing financial intermediaries, especially since
the end of World War II. Projected growth, as discussed in Chapter
II, assures them of a prominent place among major participants in
the capital markets. Starting from a relatively small base prior toImpact on Capital: Private Funds 73
World War II, these funds have passed through a complete evolu-
tionary development of investment management policy.
Initially, the restricted size and scope of noninsured plans in-
fluenced their investment along traditional trust lines. It was cus-
tomary to invest in publicly issued bonds of high quality. 1ndeed the
largest aggregation of funds, those of the Bell System, were largely
funded through the issuance of 4 per cent company notes from the
start of the plan in 1913 until the late .1930's. The transition of the
combined pension trusts of the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company and its subsidiaries is shown in Table 9.
TABLE 9
BellSystemPension Trusts, 1935—50
(book value of assets in millions of dollars at years end)
Assets 1935 1940 1945 1950
4 per cent demand andone-year notes 125.4 103.8 5.1 —
Bonds of Bell System companies 22.5 45.9 45.7 200.9
U.S. government securities 2.1 30.7 277.5 362.0
Other corporate bonds 32.9 102.7 646.6
Other investments — — — 10.1
Cash and accrued interest 2.0 11.9 12.4 11.7
Total 152.1 225.2 443.3 1,231.3
Source: American Telephone & Telegraph Company Annual Reports.
Prior to World War II, there was, in effect, no investment man-
agement of the Bell System trusts. They served merely as a medium
for accruing and recording the estimated costs of future pension
benefits.
It was a frequent practice of industrial companies to write invest-
ment restrictions into their pension trust agreements which limited
the trustee to securities legal for life insurance companies or fidu-
ciaries in New York State. As the funds grew, bank trustees urged
the inclusion of modest amounts of common stocks, in the range of
10 to 25percent. In the late 1940's, with government bond yields74 Economic Aspects of Pensions
still pegged at 2½ per cent, equities were very attractive for current
income. In 1947, for example, common stocks of good quality
offered a current return of 5percent while high-grade corporate
bonds provided only 2.58 per cent.
At about this time, bank trustees in states such as New York were
greatly concerned about the plight of beneficiaries of personal trusts
restricted to a list of bonds legal for savings banks. In 1950, they
succeeded in obtaining a 35percent prudent-man rule, enabling
them to buy common stocks up to that proportion in legal trusts. In
1951, life insurance companies were authorized to buy stocks in
limited amounts in New York State, and in the following year
mutual savings banks received similar authority.
The early postwar interest in equities, stimulated by their un-
usually favorable yield advantage, was given legislative sanction in
an important state by this series of changes ii,the laws. It was
hardly a radical step for a company to amend the trust agreement to
permit investment in securities legal for life insurance companies or
fiduciaries in New York. This automatically gave the trustee au-
thority to invest up to 35percent of the fund in common stocks.
Thus, the breakthrough in investment policy came at the incep-
tion of the period of major growth in trusteed pension fund assets.
Recognition was given to the permanence, built-in growth features,
and lack of liquidity requirements of the typical corporate pension
fund. Also, as costs mounted, business firms were made more aware
of the importance of earning the better rate of return which equities
could provide. Finally, it became increasingly clear that the com-
pany was funding a distant retirement income benefit which, to-
gether with OASI benefits, would be "suitable" or "appropriate" to
the standard of living which the employee would be enjoying at the
time of retirement. Viewed in these terms, the commitment being
funded is not determined by some precise formula devised today
and effective for decades to come, but by a level of benefits which
would carry out this broad objective. The better the earnings of the
fund, the more fruitful would be each dollar of contributions.
The transition from a concept of meeting a known liability,Impact on Capital: Private Funds 75
essentially the sinking-fund calculation of the payments needed at
an assumed rate of interest to meet a future fixed liability, took
place gradually. The dialogue between company officials and trus-
tees continued to broaden the concept of a pension trust fund. The
logical result is the conclusion that a pension trust is a bundle of
assets to be employed as productively as possible on a long-range
basis for the sole purpose of meeting pension commitments already
made (or likely to be made in the future).
The actuary's vital role in pension planning is to provide answers
to such critically important questions as the following: (1) What
benefits would a fund of a particular size, fed by a certain rate of
contributions, be most likely to provide for this group of employ-
ees? (2) What would be the cost of changing the pattern of benefits
for this group of employees? (3) How would alternative rates of
contributions affect the incidence of the costs of providing these
benefits? These and other questions involve assumptions as to mor-
tality trends, turnover among employees at various ages and after
various lengths of service, and the earnings of the fund.4 The rate of
earnings on the accumulated assets, unlike all of the other elements
of cost, is something about which the trustee can take specific steps.
It is a commonplace to observe that the future cost of a pension
program, over a long period such as twenty, thirty, or forty years, is
conjectural. Except in retrospect, no one knows precisely what the
plan costs. But the actuary could make a reliable estimate if be
knew the rate of return that will be earned. This he does not know,
nor does anyone else, except within fairly broad limits. Yet it is a
major factor. One dollar a year accumulated and invested at 4 per
cent per annum builds up to $57.20 at the end of thirty years. But if
the earnings are 5 per cent, the accumulation amounts to $68.09 in
the same period, a difference of 19 per cent.5
There are, of course, other factors to be considered; these are only the principal
ones. A clear exposition of the whole range of problems, intelligible to a layman,
is to be found in James A. Hamilton and Dorrance C. Bronson, Pensions, New
York, 1958.
Computed from Jerome Bracken and Charles Christenson, "Amount to Which
$1 per Period Will Accumulate, Received Continuously," Tables for the Analysis
of Capital Expenditures, Boston, 1961.76 Economic Aspects of Pensions
The problem of investment management, then, is not to earn any
particular rate but to earn the best possible rate which investment
opportunities permit. Corporate and government bonds, mortgages,
real estate, equities, or whatever else that provides the best long-
term net yield may be the best medium of investment. (Yield is
measured, of course, in terms of income received plus or minus
changes in value.)
Current thinking about the management of pension trust assets
has followed this line of reasoning to Its logical conclusion. The
fund is not analogous to life insurance assets or to a personal trust
or to an investment company or to any other financial institution. It
is sui generis. There is simply no other, type of trust fund like.it.6
This being the case, we might expect a distinctive pattern of
pension fund portfolios to emerge. This expectation cannot be ei-
ther supported or denied by experience to date. Investment manage-
ment in a dynamic economy like the United States is not a science,
nor can one with confidence set forth an estimate of the pattern
which will emerge over the next decade or more. Nevertheless, the
trends of recent years are suggestive and some estimates for the
future can be entertained as being plausible.
Portfolio Composition
The distribution of noninsured pension fund assets at the end of
1965 and their growth during the past decade are shown in Table
10 and Chart 1. This composite picture includes the pension plans
of business firms, nonprofit organizations, unions, and groups of
employers acting jointly with unions.
The preceding table and chart illustrate the trends of the past
decade for which good data are available. In contrast to life insur-
ance companies during the same period, pension fund trustees were
not active in the mortgage market but were in a position to expand
their common stock holdings at a rapid pace. Although it is not
6Perhapssome charitable foundations have quite similar investment management
objectives, but relatively few would be identical in all respects.Impact on Capital: Private Funds 77
possible to identify dollars, it is a fair statement that these stocks
were largely acquired with either incoming cash from contributions
and interest earnings or from temporary investments of new money.
In any event, net purchases of common stocks have not exceeded 60
per cent of net receipts.
One of the problems of obtaining good results from equity invest-
ment is, of course, the matter of timing purchases to avoid a con-
TABLE 10
Assets of Private Non insured Pension Funds, 1965






Cash and deposits 0.9 1.6 0.5
U.S. government securities 3.1 5.3 0.1
Corporate bonds 22.7 39.1 14.8
Preferred stocks 0.8 1.3 0.1
Common stocks 24.5 42.1 R 21.1
Mortgages 3.3 5.7 3.0
Other assets b 2.8 4.9 2.2
Total 58.1 100.0 41.9
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission
aIfassets are valued at market, the common stock proportion was just under 55 per
cent.
bIncludesreal estate and other assets not classified elsewhere.
centration in periods of high prices. This can be done by a strict
dollar-cost-averaging or a modification of one employing
some sort of a range concept. In the early stages of programs of
accumulation, the pattern appears to have been one of regularly
allocating a substantial fraction of new money to equities. As funds
grew in size and as initial objectives were achieved, the place of
discretionary, as distinguished from programmed, purchasing has
increased.
In the trends of recent years, certain possible implications for the
future are evident. First, it seems clear that common stocks will78 Economic Aspects of Pensions
CHART 1
Portfolios of Private Noninsured Pension Funds, 1955—65
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission.
Note: Book values, end of year.
continue to be a major outlet for investment even if they do not
prove to be quite as profitable as during the 1947—65 period of
major upward revaluation of corporate earning power. Whether the





1955'56'57'58'59'60'61'62'63164'65Impact on Capital: Private Funds 79
cent will depend upon comparative yields in all areas of the capital
markets.
In any event, it appears that there will still be a substantial
volume of business lending in the form of corporate debt, with a
major fraction of it placed directly rather than through public
offerings. Concurrently, we may expect a relatively great increase in
mortgage lending and real estate investing. All of these trends are
discussed in more detail below as part of an analysis of the partici-
pation of private pension programs in various sectors of the capital
market.
Competitive Influences
Bank and company trustees have responded to the competitive
drive of life insurance companies by seeking higher yields on fixed-
income investments and by seeking to improve performance in
managing stock portfolios.7 The evidence of a more aggressive
attitude is found in the record of sales of common stocks as a
percentage of the average market value of holdings in corporate
pension trusts.
1957 3.8 1962 4.6
1958 4.6 1963 6.3
1959 4.7 1964 7.2
1960 4.5 1965 a 7.1
1961 6.1 1966 a 7.8
Source: Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion.
aAllprivate noninsured pension funds, in-
cluding corporate.
Other evidence of this more aggressive 'attitude is to be found in a
widening of the range of companies selected for equity investment,
Evidence of this intensification of interest in investment management per-
formance is to be found in the number of studies on the subject. See, for example,
Peter 0. Dietz, Pension Funds: Measuring investment Performance, New York,
1966.80 Economic Aspects of Pensions
greater concentration in directly placed corporate bonds, mortgage
lending, and real estate investing. The stimulus of competition be-
tween trustees, always active, has been reinforced by competition
from life companies. As a result, there have been more
imaginative approaches to investment management and many inno-
vations in handling special types of assets. Special funds are estab-
lished to hold mortgages and real estate, for example, in order to
provide economical administration and diversification for the par-
ticipating pension trusts. The use of commingled funds permits
smaller accounts to share in the experience of a large and diversified
portfolio.
Another technique for stimulating competition among portfolio
managers is the practice of splitting among several bank trustees a
large fund such as that of General Motors, Eastman Kodak, or
constituent companies of the Bell System. The right to replace the
trustee on short notice, normally reserved in the trust agreement,
also militates against complacency. Some companies have estab-
lished their own investment management organizations (General
Electric, United States Steel, and Bethlehem Steel are examples) to
assure the full attention of qualified personnel.
The consequences of this greater emphasis on efforts to improve
realized yields have included the higher turnover in common stock
portfolios noted above as well as interest in a much wider diversity
of investment opportunities. Somewhat greater attention to the tim-
ing of commitments in both fixed-income securities and equities, a
very difficult undertaking, has become evident with the passing of
time. This trend represents a departure from the kind of dollar-
cost-averaging approach which predominated during earlier years.
Flexibility
Data are not available to show the extent to which pension fund
managers shift among different segments of the market for fixed-in-
come investments, but observations of the writer suggest that flexi-
bilityis becoming increasingly required by competitive forces.Impact on Capital: Private Funds 81
Willingness to realize gains and losses has increased with greater rec-
ognition of the fact that they are not really relevant to long-term
performance. Possibly this diminished "lock-in effect" has contrib-
uted to the narrowing yield differential between discount corporate
bonds and current coupon issues in the most recent period of high
interest rates.
Comprehensive and detailed information about asset manage-
ment policies is not available on a continuous basis, but it is possi-
ble to document the changes which have taken place in the manage-
ment of common stock portfolios. From the investigation of the
Fuibright Committee, completed in portions of the study
made of the New York State Banking Department in and
our analysis of representative portfolios in 1958 and 1959, we can
piece together a general picture of how pension fund trustees man-
aged their equity investments about a decade ago, when this prob-
lem had emerged as a major aspect of total asset management.
These studies indicate that, in these formative years of the invest-
ment management of rapidly growing common stock portfolios, the
practice was to invest in a relatively stable group of well-established
companies. Because the portfolios were newly selected, there were
few occasions for sales. However, there was, even then, a wide
range of opinions as to the most suitable industries and companies.
The Fulbright Committee staff selected twenty-five leading stocks
in seventeen industries for its study of activity during the thirty-four
months from January 1953 through October 1955. The concen-
tration of buying in these "institutional favorites" was highest for
corporate pension funds (Table 11).
The indicated concentration of purchases declined markedly dur-
ing the next several years. The National Bureau sample of ten
portfolios for the eighteen-month period from January 1958
through June 1959 showed only 16.5 per cent of purchases in the
SU.S.Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Institutional Investors and
the Stock Market, 1953—1 955, Washington, 1956.
George A. Mooney, Pension and Other Employee Welfare Plans, New York
State Banking Department, 1955.82 Economic Aspects of Pensions
same twenty-five leading companies.'0 Furthermore, 327 companies
were represented in these portfolios during the period. Only 42 were
owned by five or more of the funds, while 228 were owned by only
two or one of the funds. Similar data are not available for later
years, but the writer's direct observation supports the conclusion
that fund managers have continued to increase the flexibility of
their operations by broadening the range of alternatives.
TABLE 11
Purchases of 25 Selected Common Stocks and Percentage of Total Common







30corporate pension funds 201.8 24.0
5closed-end investment companies 24.0 20.6
25life insurance companies 66.0 20.3
30bank-administered common trust funds 20.0 17.5
60casualty and surety insurance companies 30.0 15.4
20open-end investment companies 265.2 15.1
40fire insurance companies 12.2 10.0
Total 619.2 17.9
Source: Fuibright Committee Report.
The other major aspects of flexibility are, of course, in the timing
of equity purchases relativeto fixed-income investments and
changes in the proportions of funds allocated to different types of
bonds and stocks. Aggregate data for all trusteed pension funds
10 NationalBureau sample was provided on a confidential basis by nine
banks which are leaders in the administration of corporate pension trusts. These
banks probably managed more than 50 per cent of all corporate pension funds.
Each bank selected an unidentified fund which was well established, unrestricted
as to investments, and under the bank's sole control. In effect, the quarterly state-
ments furnished to us from December 31, 1957, through June 30, 1959, recorded
each bank's unfettered judgment of what investment policy should be. For the
analysis of common stock activity, the College Retirement Equities Fund was
added to provide a tenth portfolio.Impact on Capital: Private Funds 83
conceal a wide range of policies pursued in individual funds. Over
the eighteen-month period, the banks in the National Bureau sam-
ple showed a range from less than 23 per cent to more than 45 per
cent in the allocation of new funds to common stocks. In six-month
periods, the range of allocation was between 7 and 69 per cent
despite an apparently stable level for the group as a whole of
between 34 and 42 per cent. A similar pattern was found in the
analysis of purchases of stocks when classified as defensive, cyclical,
cyclical-growth, and growth issues. Divergent responses to changes
in the economic environment and to shifts in relative values in the
market place make sweeping generalizations about how pension
funds invest in equities of doubtful validity. The available evidence
supports rather the existence of wide variations among the strategies
and selective processes of different portfolio managers.
Little or no support is found for the view sometimes expressed
that the concentration of pension fund investing in a small number
of leading company shares is tending to create scarcity premiums on
institutional favorites. Attempts to identify such premiums have
been unproductive and there are no surprises in the results. Pension
funds are only one modest factor in a market which adjusts to
underlying factors of earnings, dividends, •growth, and stability.
While price adjustments to changing expectations may take place
slowly at times, there appears to be no compartmentalization of the
market for equities which can create a different valuation for a few
or many pension fund favorites in the market place. The increase in
competitive pressures on portfolio managers, combined with the
greater flexibility in investment decisions which has developed over
the years, has largely eliminated tendencies toward concentration in
relatively few issues,if,indeed, they ever existed in sufficient
strength to influence selected stock prices.
Multiemployer and Union Pension Funds
Results of the National Bureau study of the asset growth of
multiemployer and union pension funds, 1959—64, are reported84 Economic Aspects of Pensions
more fully in Occasional Paper 105.11Theportfolio composition of
these funds, as Bartell has shown, varies in several material respects
from the composite picture of trusteed corporate pension funds. A
comparison for the year 1964, for example, shows the corporate
funds holding higher proportions of assets in common stocks (41 .6
per cent vs. 23.5 per cent at book values). Mortgages and govern-
ment bonds were more favored by the multiemployer and union
funds. These differences are not diminishing materially over time
because of the active interest of many unions in contributing to the
supply of funds for housing. Some of the newer and more rapidly
growing funds have, however, given increasing emphasis to com-
mon stock investment.
The future pattern of investment policy will undoubtedly be
influenced by certain union positions, notably instances of prefer-
ences for mortgages and real estate over common stocks. Despite
the relatively rapid growth rate anticipated for the years immedi-
ately ahead, these differences will have relatively little influence
since their proportion of the total assets of trusteed pension funds
will increase only from 6.3 per cent to perhaps 7 or 8 per cent.
If the unions should succeed in negotiating a voice in the man-
agement of single-employer funds, more pressure might be exerted
on fund managers to finance housing or other "socially desirable"
projects. On the basis of developments to date, this possibility seems
remote and there is some basis for questioning whether there would
be any significant change in fund flows even if unions did obtain a
voice in investment management decisions.12
Nonprofit Organizations
The smaller, but still vigorously growing, noninsured pension
funds of nonprofit organizations represent less than 3 per cent of all
See Part I of H. Robert Bartell, Jr., and Elizabeth T. Simpson, Pension Funds
of Multiemployer Industrial Groups, Unions, and Nonprofit Organizations, New
York, NBER, 1968.
12 See the writer's "Management Interests in the Investment of Pension Funds,"
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Annual Winter Meeting of the industrial Relations
Research Association, December 1965, pp. 312—316.Impact on Capital: Private Funds 85
private noninsured funds. As shown in the study by Simpson com-
pleted as part of the National Bureau's pension research project,13
the asset composition of these funds is similar to the typical mul-
tiemployer portfolio.
Again, possible changes in investment policies will not have an
important influence on aggregate capital market flows. Somewhat
greater emphasis on common stocks and mortgage lending is indi-
cated by the trends of recent years, but these asset shifts are in the
same direction as those evident in single-employer funds.
FUTURE CAPITAL MARKET FLOWS
Recent Trends
A comparison of net flows through the capital markets during
two recent years, 1.960 and 1965, will serve to illustrate the impor-
tance, as suppliers of funds, of insured and trusteed pension pro-
grams covering individuals in private employment. For three major
capital market sectors, the combined total of net acquisitions of
financial assets by these two investor groups is expressed as a frac-
tion of the net change in selected categories of assets. In the case of
life insurance companies, the arbitrary assumption is made that
assets acquired to fund pension plan reservçs are distributed in the
same proportions as all asset acquisitions.
The important trends to be observed from Table 12 are the shifts
away from corporate bonds to corporate stocks and mortgages.
Within the mortgage category, moreover, there has been a shift to
multifamily and commercial, property lending as contrasted with the
prior concentration of lending in the one- to four-family market.
Direct investment in real estate has also been growing in impor-
tance, although not of sufficient size to be separately classified in the
table.'
As both life insurance companies and pension fund portfolio
managers have concentrated their corporate bond investments in
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directly placed issues, they have relinquished leadership in the mar-
ket for publicly offered bonds to state and local government retire-
ment systems. This shift has now been largely completed to the
extent that offerings and yields make directly placed issues competi-
tively attractive.
The net purchases of corporate stocks (largely common) have
run in excess of net new issues by business firms, excluding invest-
ment companies (see note b in Table 12). This fact has given rise
to widespread discussion of the growth in institutionalization of
stock ownership, particularly when the growth of mutual funds is
also taken into account.14 The net flows in the market for equity
securities show a persistent transfer of stock ownership from indi-
viduals and "all others" to professional managers. The data ex-
aggerate, however, the impact of this trend on the market for
equities.
In the first place, net new issues understate the supply of shares
suitable for institutional ownership. Retirements tend to be dispro-
portionately large for the smaller companies not widely available
for public investment. That is to say, retirements are heavily con-
centrated in small privately owned businesses which sell their assets
to large publicly owned corporations. Similarly, when a closely held
company merges with one having a wide distribution of share own-
ership, the supply of broadly marketable shares is increased without
a new issue being recorded. At least during recent years of great
merger activity, this imparting of marketability to inactively traded
common stocks has substantially exceeded the volume of recorded
retirements. Gross new issues, therefore, better measure the quan-
tity of new shares broadly available for pension fund investment.
On average, this might add upward of $1.5 or $2.0 billion a year to
what can be considered as the supply of new issues in the market
place. Spot checks have shown that a disproportionately large frac-
tion of the gross financing (including senior securities convertible
See,for example, Daniel Seligman and T. A. Wise, "New Forces in the Stock
Market," Fortune, February 1964, pp. 92—95, 194—206.88 Economic Aspects of Pensions
into common stock) has been done by companies which are promi-
nent in pension fund portfolios.
Second, we know that even gross new issues are not a true
measure of the volume of equity financing. In a real sense, retained
earnings represent a privileged subscription, a rights offering if you
will, which has been fully taken up by existing stockholders. From
1961 through 1965, retained corporate profits averaged $18.5
billion a year, compared with new offerings of common stocks
averaging only $2.0 billion a year. Pension funds, of course, "pur-
chased" their proportionate share of these retained earnings.
Third, the supply of equity securities is constantly being enlarged
in the market place from sales by wealthy individuals or •their
executors to meet federal and state taxes on the transfer of property
by gift or bequest. To the extent that the proceeds of these sales are
used to meet such tax payments, instead of being reinvested in other
common stocks, they measure a demand for equity capital in the
market place in the same way as new stock issues. In a typical year,
it appears that sales for these purposes are about as large as gross
new issues.
In short, the net acquisitions of common stocks for private em-
ployee pension programs appear very large only when some major
components of the aggregate supply are ignored. In perspective, it is
evident that these investors are still only one important factor in the
market and that their operations can have only a limited influence
on the behavior of share prices.
Transaction studies made by the New York Stock Exchange over
the last fifteen years show that, prior to 1965, institutions and
intermediaries typically accounted for less than 25 per cent of the
volume on that exchange. Studies in March 1965 and October
1966, however, showed 31.4 per cent and 32.5 per cent respec-
tively. In the year 1965, when purchases and sales on the New
York Stock Exchange (twice reported sales volume) came to
$146.4 billion, the total of trusteed pension funds' purchases and
sales (obviously not all on the New York Stock Exchange) came toImpact on Capital: Private Funds 89
$8 .1 billion. Possibly these funds accounted for 5 per cent of the
total. This would compare with about 4 per cent in 1960 and less
than 2 per cent in 1955.
Pension funds can hardly be credited with a major role in the
short-run behavior of share prices despite the rapid growth in their
participation in the market. They did, however, perform a stabiliz-
ing function in the 1962 market break 15andsustained their net
purchases in good volume during the 1966 market decline.
Most recently, concern has been expressed over the rise in turn-
over rates for pension trusts and life insurance companies, presuma-
bly under the strong competitive pressure for performance. As such
turnover rates are frequently computed (the average of purchases
and sales divided by average holdings), a rapidly growing portfolio
tends to show a relatively high figure. Nevertheless, trusteed private
pension funds for the decade through 1965 typically showed a
turnover rate of between 11 and 12 per cent, well below the range
of 12 and 16 per cent for all stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange, and a 17 to 21 per cent range for open-end investment
companies.
As the emphasis on performance mounted in 1966, however,
turnover rates exploded to 33 per cent for open-end investment
companies, the group on which the impact of this emphasis was
strongest. In contrast, a rise of about two percentage points in the
turnover rate for trusteed pension funds and life insurance compa-
nies was no more than the rise in the New York Stock Exchange
turnover rate.
While developments to date have had only a modest impact on
the structure of the market for common stocks, it must be recog-
nized that further increases in the rate of turnover in institutional
portfolios could bring about major changes in the structure of
markets. A rise in the volume of block transactions of 10,000
15SeeNew York Stock Exchange, The Stock Market Under Stress, New York,
March 1963, and Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Special Study
of Securities Markets, Part 4, Chapter XIII, Washington, 1963.90 Economic Aspects of Pensions
shares or more from 3 per cent to 4.5 per cent of total New York
Stock Exchange volume is the principal consequence to date of
greater institutional activity. An inventory of institutional owner-




of dollars) of Total
Personal trust funds 71,9 10.7
Investment companies 41.1 6.1
Trusteed private pension funds 39.7 5.9
Foundations 14.1 2.1
Property and casualty insurance
companies 12.4 1.8
Life insurance companies 9.1 1.3
College endowments 6.4 0.9
Bank common trust funds 3.5 0.5
State and local government trust
funds 2.2 0.3
Total for selected institutions 200.4 29.7
All others, including foreigners 474.3 70.3
Total outstanding 674.7 100.0
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of Invest-
mentCompany Growl/i, Washington,D.C.,1966,pp. 276—277.
No doubt, much more than 30 per cent of all stocks are under
some form of institutional supervision or professional management.
Data on the whole range of investment advisory services are not
available. However, if the turnover of outstanding shares is to
increase materially in the future, many holders other than pension
funds will have to participate on a broad scale.
Neither the proposition that pension funds bid up the share prices
for a limited group of "institutional favorites" nor the proposition-n
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that they are contributing to price volatility in selected shares can be
supported by available evidence. On the contrary, it appears that
portfolio managers are broadening their range of investment alter-
natives and taking advantage of the long time horizon implicit in
their decisions.
A Look at the Future
The long-run future of pension fund activities in the capital
market will depend upon the economic environment and the de-
mands for capital which are created. Rather than speculate on these
matters, however, it may be more useful to set forth some educated
guesses about the future flow of funds to indicate the range of
possibilities over the next decade and more.
For this purpose, it is not too important whether insurance com-
panies, bank trustees, or others administer the funds. An equity
investment, a directly-placed corporate obligation, a real estate
mortgage loan, or a real estate purchase does not carry the label of
the decision-maker into the capital market. Furthermore, life insur-
ance companies are improving their capabilities to handle equity
investments just as bank trustees are building up their facilities for
mortgage and real estate investing. In the future, it will clearly
make less difference to the flow of funds in the capital market
whether a dollar of pension contribution goes to any particular class
of institution or type of investment manager.
It is vitally important, however, whether Holland's projections of
pension fund flows prove to be close to the actual events. As he
correctly points out, the margin of error is likely to be modest for
1970 or 1975, but can increase materially for 1980. Essentially,
he assumed that the role of social security in the years ahead would
not substantially change from what it has been. A few of the other
crucial assumptions relate to the pace of increases in coverage,
changes in standards for vesting and funding, and the rate of return
earned by the investment portfolios.
Because changes in a number of the variables can have the effect92 Economic Aspects of Pensions
of producing offsetting influences on the size of asset accumula-
tions, we can have confidence in using Holland's average annual
fund accumulation despite some recent surge of growth in years of
high corporate earning power. His projections for the pace of
annual net addition to assets follow.





Source: Holland's projections, Table 28, P. 69.
This projected leveling off in fund accumulations, whether it
occurs in another decade or is delayed by current developments, is
the most significant aspect of future influences on capital market
flows. Given an orderly pace of economic growth, it means that
pension funds for individuals in private employment will account
for a diminishing fraction of total net acquisitions of financial
assets.
As trusteed portfolios become more seasoned—that is to say, as
the average holding period of fixed-income securities lengthens—
maturities and repayments will become much more important. In
the 1970's, we may anticipate that gross acquisitions will continue
to rise long after net acquisitions have leveled off. A projection
for any year after 1970 'will, therefore, be subject to a wide margin
of error when expressed in terms of net acquisitions. With all of these
qualifications, it may be useful to look at some possible patterns
for the future (Table 13).
The division of fund flows between bond, mortgage, and real
estate investments is clearly a function of relative yields and terms.
Since it is impossible to determine precisely what these will be, the
distribution of funds among assets other than common stocks shown
in Table 13 has been arbitrarily made. Some weight has beenImpact on Capital: Private Funds 93
given, however, to the anticipated strength in housing demand
around the turn of this decade.
To project a meaningful flow of funds into corporate stocks
(largely common), however, it was necessary to take some account
of the effects of market appreciation, reflecting the value of retained
earnings. If this appreciation should average 5percent per annum
in the years ahead—not an unreasonable assumption on the basis of
past history and one consistent with the pursuit by fund managers of
TABLE 13
Possible Future Net Acquisitions of Financial
Assets by Pension Funds Covering Individuals
in Private Employment, 1970, 1975, and 1980
(billions of dollars)
Assets 1970 1975 1980
Government securities a 0.2 0.2
Corporate and other bonds 1.3 1.9 2.4
Corporate stocks 4.3 3.0 2.0
Mortgages 1.6 2.0 2.2
Other assets, including realestate 0.3 0.5 0.6
Total 7.5 7.6 7.4
a Negligible.
an aggressive program to increase and maintain a substantial posi-
tion in equities—the composition of total portfolios would be ap-
proximately as shown in Table 14.
The pattern of net financial asset acquisitions presented here is
conjectural, to be sure, but it attempts to recognize several impor-
tant changes which will or may occur. The striking feature is, of
course, the projected decline in net acquisitions of common stocks
after 1970. This possibility deserves to be recognized because of
the following three factors or assumptions:
1. It is assumed that life insurance companies will greatly ex-
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ofseparate accounts. Similarly, trusteed funds are expected to be
heavy investors in equities in order to increase the proportion in
existing portfolios. The increase in the common stock component of
the Bell System pension trusts is a substantial case in point. As a
consequence of these factors, common stocks are assumed to in-
crease from 30.0 per cent in 1965 to 38.7 per cent by the end of
1970 at book values, and from 40.8 per cent to 50.0 per cent at
market values.
2. As the number of beneficiaries climbs in the years immedi-
ately ahead, funds accumulated under insured deposit administra-
tion contracts will be used to purchase guaranteed annuities for the
pensioner. These funds, along with assets supporting existing de-
ferred group and individual annuity contracts, will be invested
largely in fixed-income securities. This is the dramatic maturing of
pension promises, involving a doubling of the number of individuals
drawing benefits between 1965 and 1973. It would be reasonable
to suppose that at least $30 billion of the $130 billion in assets
other than common stocks at market values projected for 1980 will
be supporting insured annuity contracts on a guaranteed basis. If
these are eliminated from the total, the proportion in common
stocks would be close to 61 per cent instead of 54percent.
3. With increasing recognition of the fact that market, rather
than book, values are the significant measure of assets and yields, it
is assumed that portfolio decisions will be based primarily on the
distribution of assets valued at average market prices. The fund, in
reality, is recognizing the purchase of retained earnings with the
receipts from average market appreciation. For example, for the
year 1976, in terms of these projections, the pension funds will
receive $7.7 billion in net additions to assets plus $5.65billionin
appreciation on the $1 13.0 billion common stock portfolio at the
assumed average rate of 5percent. The investment in equities is the
projected $2.0 billion in cash plus $5.65 billion in appreciation, or
a total of $7.65 billion, which represents 57 per cent of total "net
receipts" of $13.35 billion for the year.96 Economic Aspects of Pensions
Obviously, this possible projection is not susceptible of proof,
and the declining allocation of funds to common stocks is not
essential to our conclusions. This exercise in quantifying a possible
change in trend serves its purpose if it only raises a question in the
minds of those who make freehand extrapolations of the rising
volume of net purchases of common stocks by these groups of
investors. Even a stable level of net common stock acquisitions
would mean a diminution of capital market influence. Such a stable
allocation at,' say, 60 per cent of net additions to assets would
produce the following results in 1980, using the same assumptions
as in Table 14.




Common stocks 93 47 182 63
All other assets 105 53 108 37
'Total 198 100 290 100
The relatively modest change in assets at market value is attributa-
ble to the delay in the projected cutbacks in stock purchases until
after 1970 and 1975.
The reader may well conclude that this possible future allocation
of funds is more probable than that shown in Table 13. However,
even this higher level of net acquisitions implies that, in a growing
capital market, the role of these investors in the market for corpo-
rate stocks is already close to its peak and will be declining in the
future. On the other hand, the possible pattern in Table 13 would
suggest a resurgence of influence in the markets for directly placed
corporate obligations, mortgages, and real estate.
But these pension fund managers will continue to be a major
factor in the market for common stocks outstanding in the hands ofImpact on Capital: Private Funds 97
the public. The recent growth of block transactions on the New
York Stock Exchange illustrates one of the adaptations of the mar-
ket mechanism which is necessary to handle the growing volume of
turnover in institutional portfolios. Given the projected volume of
equity holdings by 1980, it is evident that an adjustment in the
balance between fixed- and variable-income securities can create
substantial swings in the amount of net acquisitions. There is little
reason to expect that purchases will be made at the even pace
implied by Table 13. Nor, indeed, can it be accepted as a certainty
that fund managers will inevitably continue their steady accumula-
tion of common stocks through sustained or even brief periods of
adverse experience. In short, much greater variability in net acquisi-
tions of equity securities must be expected in the years ahead.
One final qualification to all these estimates and conjectures: If
variable annuity pension plans spread widely among industrial em-
ployers, it will be necessary to modify substantially the entire range
of possible asset acquisition patterns. Only the future can tell
whether this is a real possibility. The increasing familiarity of the
public with common stocks and renewed concern over inflationary
pressures in the economy are factors conducive to the adoption of
variable benefit plans. However, stock purchase plans, savings plans
which include equity investments, and profit-sharing plans provide
outlets for this interest in owning common stocks without disturbing
the stability of fixed-dollar pension programs.